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AbStRACt
This study compared the extent of compounded and court cases and the penalties charged for the 
two categories of offences. Data on 119 offences, of which 73% were compounded cases covering 
the period 1998 to 2002, were analysed. It was found that the mean penalty charged per offence was 
higher for compounded cases (RM37,180) than court cases (RM26,988). The mean penalties for 
illegal logging, evasion of royalty and encroachment compounded cases were RM91, 690, RM27, 932 
and RM147, 000, respectively. Meanwhile, the corresponding values for the court cases were RM39, 
500, RM12 668 and RM47, 760, respectively. Further analysis revealed that there was no significant 
difference in the mean penalties between the three types of offences for the court cases. However, 
there were significant differences in mean penalties for the the compounded cases. In addition, 
the regression model developed showed that for every unit increase in the cubic meter of illegal 
logging, there was a corresponding increase in the penalty by RM4692.39 for the courts cases and 
RM3151.17 for the compounded cases. The results suggested that, in terms of deterrence, the courts 
are the better means for punishing forest offenders.
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INtRODUCtION
Forest offences are any activities which contravene 
the provisions of the forestry law of the state 
and they are a hindrance to sustainable forest 
management. The forest law prohibits many 
activities relating to the taking of forest produce, 
however, the major ones are felling outside 
concession boundaries, removing more timber 
than stipulated in concession contracts, felling in 
protected areas, cutting protected tree species, 
encroachment into forests for cultivation and 
evasion of royalty. Forest offences are parts of 
a wider spectrum of illegal forestry practices, 
which cover not only forest offences but the entire 
market chain, from illegal transport to industrial 
processing and trade operations, all the way down 
the line to markets.
Globally, the World Bank has estimated that illegal 
forestry practices cost the legal forest industry 
more than US$10 billion per year and deprive 
governments of about US$5 billions in revenue 
(World Bank, 2005). In addition, the problems 
of illegal forestry activities are not confined solely 
to the tropics. In the US, illegal logging on public 
lands is estimated to cost more than US$1 billion 
per annum (Humphreys, 2006).
 Forest offences, particularly illegal logging, 
are not new issues in the local forestry scene. The 
problem was particularly critical in the early 1990s 
at the time when the economy of the country was 
recovering from economic recessions. Logging 
activities accelerated to take opportunities of 
the buoyant demands for timber in overseas 
markets. In order to address the issue of illegal 
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logging, the Federal government amended the 
National Forestry Act in 1993 to incorporate 
higher penalties for such activities. Studies 
have shown that illegal logging cases have since 
been declining, but they still haunt the forestry 
authority (Rusli and Amat Ramsa, 2003).
   Tackling illegal logging activities is one of the 
priorities of the State Forestry Department, which is 
the focus of the study. In addition to incorporating 
higher penalties in the amendments of the State 
forest law, the authority also established the 
Monitoring, Control, Evaluation and Enforcemen 
(MCEE), Special Investigation Team, Illegal 
Logging Task Force and Mobile Crack Unit 
(Miskon, 2003). The establishment of these 
machineries has brought positive results in the 
detection of illegal logging and related activities 
throughout the state (Dilimin, 2003, Personal 
communication). 
Punishment for Forest Offenders
The Forest Enactment 1968 is the legal base for 
forest law enforcement in the State. The Enactment 
essentially contains provisions on establishment 
and excision of forest estate, its management, 
collection of revenue, as well as enforcement and 
penalties. The amendments made thus far provide 
for, among other matters, higher penalties for all 
offences, particularly illegal logging. Among the 
main offences prohibited by the law include illegal 
felling [S. 20(2) and S. 23(2)], evasion of royalty 
[S. 30(1) and S. 30A(1)], encroachment [S. 20(1) 
and S. 23(1)], illegal possession [S. 30(1)], illegal 
removal [S.23(1)) and cheating in the taking of 
forest produce [S.30(1)(a) to (f)]. The rationale 
for introducing higher penalties is to curb the 
occurrence of these offences.
 Depending on the nature and seriousness 
of the offence, the Forestry Authority has either 
offered the offences to be compounded or brought 
the offenders to courts for trial.  Compounding 
of forest offences is only an option and this is 
handled by the the Authority, particularly for 
offences which are committed for the first time [S. 
35(2)]. However, the offender can also be brought 
to court for committing a serious offence even for 
the first time. This is particularly so for offences 
like illegal logging and forest encroachment 
involving a large forest area or a large quantity 
of logs (Dilimim, personal communication). 
The courts, on the other hand, can impose fines 
or jail sentence or both on those found guilty 
committing forest offences. 
 According to the Enactment, forest offences 
can be compounded with any amount which is less 
than the maximum fine for that particular offence 
and it has to be paid within a specified time [S.35 
(1)]. For offences involving illegal taking or 
removing forest produce, those who commit them 
may be asked to pay, in addition to compounds, a 
sum not exceeding ten times the royalty, premium 
and cess; a sum not exceeding ten times the value 
of the produce; the costs of repairing any damage 
in respect of the offence committed, and any other 
charges payable to the state authority. Therefore, 
theoretically, the amount of fines is influenced by 
volume of logs illegally removed, their prices, rate 
of royalty, rate of premium, amount of damage 
done to the forest.
 The maximum penalty for illegally taking 
and removing forest produce is quite punitive. 
The offence is liable to be punished with fines 
to a maximum of RM500,000 and be sent for 
imprisonment for a maximum period of twenty 
years or both. In addition, the offender can be 
asked to pay compensations, which is a sum not 
exceeding ten times the royalty, premium and cess, 
and a sum not exceeding ten times the value of 
the produce. 
  
Past Research on Forest Offences
No previous research has been carried out to look 
at the roles of courts in punishing forest offenders. 
Several research have been done, however, to 
understand some factors affecting the occurrences 
and severity of punishments for forest offenders. 
The predictors which have been investigated 
include forestry factors, such as the size of forest 
area, number of enforcement officers and price 
of logs (Rusli, 1999; Rusli and Faridah, 2003). In 
addition to these, some macro-economic factors, 
such as rate of unemployment, per capita GNP 
and rate of inflation have also been analysed 
(Rusli, 2001, unpublished). The results of these 
research works revealed that the price of logs 
had a significant negative correlation with forest 
offences, particularly illegal logging. It means 
that the incidence of forest offences is higher 
when the economy slides down and, vice versa. 
Further analysis indicated that the price of logs, 
belonging to the heavy hardwood and medium 
hardwood species, were better predictors of illegal 
logging in permanent reserved forests. It was also 
found out that certain macro-economic factors, 
such as the rate of unemployment, had a positive 
correlation with illegal logging as well as other 
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forest offenders. Once again, this suggests that 
forest crimes are committed in times of economic 
recession.  
 Some other research have also looked at the 
impacts of some factors influencing the severity of 
punishment for forest offenders, particularly the 
impacts of volume and the price of logs, as well as 
the roles of the forestry authority. One particular 
study by Rusli and Nik Suraya (2004) found that 
all the three factors mentioned earlier significantly 
explain the variations in the amount of fines. The 
study showed that the amount of punishment 
increased with the increasesd in volume and price 
of illegal logs, and varied between different State 
Forestry Directors. Therefore, this suggests that 
the severity of punishment commensurate with 
severity of offences committed. 
MAtERIALS AND MEtHODS
This study used records on forest offences covering 
the period from 1998 to 2002 kept at the State 
Forestry Authority. These records are compiled 
by the relevant divisions based on the reports 
submitted by District Forest Officers. Details which 
are recorded for each of the offences include 
the investigation officer, nature and location 
of offences, equipment seized, volumes of logs 
involved, mode of settlement (compounding or 
court decisions), as well as fines imposed and logs 
auction value.   
 The records on forest offenders also contain 
explanatory notes on the decisions made for not 
pursuing further certain offences. In most cases, 
no further actions were taken on the offences 
because of the lack of evidence. Explanations are 
also given on the status of the stolen logs. It was 
observed that most stolen logs were auctioned 
out. However, in instances when there were no 
interested buyers, the logs were destroyed. 
 The data were subjected to both descriptive 
and inferential analytical techniques. The 
descriptive technique was used to analyse data on 
fines imposed in order to understand the severity 
of punishment relative to what are provided for 
by the law. In particular, the Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) Regression Model was used to 
determine the effects of log volumes and the 
mode of settlement on the amount of fines. This 
technique was also used to overcome the problem 
of heteroscedasticity of the scatter diagram found 
in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model. The use of OLS technique for the data 
would give less accurate results (Gujarati, 2003).
 The WLS regression model is of the following 
format:
 F1 = α + β1 V1 + β2 D_Type  +  ε1 
Where:
F1 = Total amount of fine imposed (Ringgit 
 Malaysia)
V1 = Volume of illegal logs (m
3)
D = Dummy variable for mode of settlement 
 (1=court; 0=compound)
      α β are parameters, ε is random error in the 
zero mean
 The model suggests that the amount of fines, 
or the compounds in the case of compounded 
cases, is a function of the volume of logs illegally 
removed and the mode of settlement, namely 
by court (D=1) or by forestry authority (D=O). 
The amount of fine was hypothesized to increase 
with volume of logs, both for the compounded 
and court cases. However, the marginal increase 
in fine was expected to be higher for the court 
cases as compared to the compounded cases. This 
hypothesis was made with the understanding that 
courts should be more deterrent than the forestry 
authority in handling forest offenders.
RESULtS AND DISCUSSIONS
The Occurrence of Forest Offences
Fig. 1 shows the occurrence of various categories of 
forest offences for the period of 1998 – 2002. The 
highest incidence was recorded in 2002, while the 
lowest was in 2000. The increase in the number of 
recorded offences after 2000 could be attributed 
to the stepping up of the efforts in the detection 
of illegal activities since the establishment of the 
MCEE unit (Miskon, 2003).
 Evasion of royalty and breach of license 
conditions seemed to occur most frequently 
among the various categories of offence. These 
two types make up more than 86 percent of the 
total number of offence. The results showed 
that most offences were committed by licensed 
timber operators and not by those without license, 
for example, the local community. The greater 
tendency of license holders than non-license 
holders to commit forest offences could be due 
to their belief that (through their experience) 
the expected punishment for such offences is not 
punitive (Rusli, 1998).
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The Comparison of  Fines for Forest Offences
Table 1 shows the breakdown of cases by mode of 
settlement (court or compounded) while Table 2 
presents the comparison on the mean amount of 
fines by types of offences. 
 Information presented in Tables 1 and 2 
suggest that the courts do not punish the offenders 
more severely than the Forestry Department. The 
average fine for court cases, committed for the five-
year period, is approximately RM27,000 while that 
for the Department is about RM37,180. Likewise, 
the mean fines for the three types of offences 
for court cases are lower than the compounded 
cases.
 The findings are not quite as expected 
because the courts are hoped to punish more 
Year
Court cases Compounded cases Average Fine 
(Court)
Average Fine 
(Cpd)
No
Amount 
of Fines
No
Amount 
of Fines
1998 6 67660.00 23 262748.70 11276.66 11423.85
1999 6 13600.00 9 220114.63 2266.66 24457.18
2000 6 18500.00 2 3000.00 3083.33 1500.00
2001 10 330860.00 8 521226.00 33086.00 65153.25
2002 4 433000.00 45 2227577.52 108250.00 49501.72
TOTAL 32 863620.00 87 3234666.85 26988.12 37180.07
TABLE 1
Breakdown of the court and compounded cases and their fines, 1998 - 2002
Fig. 1: Occurrence of various forest offences, 1998-2002
ILLEGAL  = Illegal Logging
ROYALTY = Evasion of Royalty
ENCRO = Encroachment into Forest Areas
ILLEGAL  = Illegal Removal of  Timber
BREACH  = Breach of License Conditions
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severely than the forestry authority for every case 
brought to them. In addition to imposing fines, 
the courts are empowered to pass jail sentences to 
those found guilty of committing forest offences. 
Presumably realising that fact, the authority took 
even first-time offenders to courts and did not 
offer them any compounds. 
 Further analysis showed that there was no 
significant difference in the mean fines, between 
the three categories of offences, as handled by 
the court (F=1.075, p=0.35). However, unlike the 
court, there were significant differences in the 
mean fines for the compounded forest offences 
as handled by the Authority (F=5.64, p=0.00). 
These findings suggest that, whether intentional 
or otherwise, the court does not seem to look at 
the severity of the offences as measured by the 
maximum legally prescribed penalty when giving 
out their punishment. In other words, the decision 
to punish an offence, with a certain amount of 
fines, is not influenced by the maximum penalty 
of that particular offence. As stipulated in the 
law, the maximum fine for illegal logging is more 
severe than forest encroachment than for evasion 
of royalty. 
Factors Influencing/Determining the Amount of Fines 
Table 3 shows the results from the regression 
analysis on the effects of illegal log volume and 
the mode of settlement on the amount of fines. 
As can be seen, both variables significantly affect 
the amount of fines. The WLS regression model 
developed indicates that for every unit increase in 
the volume of log illegally removed, there will be 
a corresponding increase in fine by RM4692.39 
for the court cases. However, the corresponding 
increase in fine for the compounded cases is lower 
by RM1541.22. This means that the court punishes 
more severely that the Department for every cubic 
meter of stolen logs.  
 The findings appear to suggest that the 
court’s decisions on the amount of fines are 
guided more by the volume of stolen logs rather 
than by the maximum penalty as prescribed in the 
law. Consequently, the severity of offences seems 
to be measured by the volume of illegal logs.
 One of the main objectives of punishment 
is to hurt offenders so that they will not commit 
the same offence and that the society is protected 
from the impacts of their wrongdoings. In the 
case of forest offenders, the goal of punishment 
should be to deter the occurrence of such 
offences so that the forests are protected and 
the society will continue to enjoy the benefits 
from the forests. The impacts of illegal forestry 
activities, as highlighted earlier, can be very costly 
to the government and the industry and for these 
reasons, such activities must be checked. Those 
who commit illegal forestry activities should be 
appropriately punished, by either the court system 
Case Type Type of offences
Illegal logging Evasion of Royalty Encroachment
Court 39500.00 12668.00 47760.00
Compounded 91690.00 27932.00 147000.00
TABLE 2
Comparison of the mean amount of fines for three types of forest offences, 1998-2002
Variable Constant Volume Settlement Mode** F value
Value of 
coefficients
124.88 3026.29* 1541.22* 25.17
TABLE 3
Results of the WLS regression analysis
R2 = 0.326;  
*    Significant at 0.05 level of confidence    
** Differences in fines imposed by court and amount of compounding by forestry authority
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or the forestry authority. However, should the 
forestry authority compound offenders or bring 
them to court for sentencing?
 The results on the comparison of punishment 
between the two modes of punishment show that 
the average fines for compounded offences are 
greater than the court cases by about RM10, 000 
per case. It appears, therefore, compounding 
forest offences is justified if the basis for doing it 
is to generate income to the forestry authority and 
the government. There is even better justification 
for compounding if the income generated could 
be invested for forest development activities, 
particularly to rehabilitate the areas left degraded 
by illegal forestry activities, specifically illegal 
logging and encroachment. 
 The results of the regression analysis show 
that the court system penalizes more severely than 
the forestry authority for every cubic meter of log 
illegally taken out from the forest by a factor of 
about 1.5:1.0. In other words, the court system 
ensures greater severity of punishment for forest 
similar offences than the Authority. The goal of 
deterrence, therefore, is better achieved through 
the court system than through compounding. 
Moreover, greater deterrence can even be created 
if the court system imposes penalties other than 
fines on those found guilty of committing illegal 
forestry activities. One of these penalties should 
definitely be jail sentences, no matter how short 
these may be. 
CONCLUSIONS
Illegal forestry activities can seriously harm the 
government and forest industry and such activities 
have to be closely monitored for the future benefits 
of the society as a whole. One of the strategies 
which can be used to handle illegal forestry 
activities is to punish the offenders severely so as 
to deter them from repeating the offences in the 
future. The forestry authority in this country has 
taken the right step in that direction by amending 
the forest law and incorporating higher penalties 
for forest offenders.  However, enacting the law 
is one step and implementing it is another one. 
There must be greater commitment to see that 
those committing the offences are punished to 
the tune, as prescribed by the law.
 The results presented earlier show that it 
is not enough to compound forest offenders if 
the goal is to create deterrence among future 
offenders. Compounding forest offenders appears 
to be justified if the goal is to generate income 
from these forest offenders. The court system, 
however, punishes forest offenders according to 
the severity of the offences, as measured by the 
volume of logs illegally taken out. Therefore, if 
all the evidences are available, those committing 
forest offences should be brought to courts for 
trial, because the court system is more likely to 
prevent forest offences being repeated in the 
future by similar or other offenders.
 Earlier analysis did not consider any costs 
which have to be expended, either in the process 
of compounding or in taking cases to the court 
system. The analysis only compared the fines (or 
revenue) through compounding and the court 
system. As such, the true costs and benefits of 
the two modes of handling forest offences have 
not been obtained and compared. The costs and 
benefits of jail sentencing will also need to be 
investigated. Therefore, it is recommended that 
further research be carried out to determine all 
the costs associated with compounding and the 
court system of handling forest offences.
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